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Market Efficiency in the Age of Machine Learning
Abstract
As machines replace humans in financial markets, how is informational efficiency impacted? We shed
light on this issue by exploiting unique data that allow us to identify when machines access company
information (8-K filings) versus when humans access the same information. We find that increased
access by machines, particularly from cloud computing services, significantly improves informational
efficiency and reduces the price drift following information events. We address identification through
instrumental variables, exogenous power and cloud outages, and a quasi-natural experiment. We
show that machines are better able to handle linguistically complex filings and are less susceptible
to bias from negative sentiment, whereas humans are better at combining incremental information.
Keywords: Market efficiency; Information acquisition; Artificial intelligence; Algorithmic trading.
JEL Classification Codes: G10; G12; G14.
“Thirty years ago the best fund manager was the one with the best intuition. . . Now those who take
a “scientific approach”, using machines, data and AI, can have an edge.”
David Siegel, co-chairman of Two Sigma (The Economist, October 5th, 2019)
1. Introduction
As machines replace humans in financial markets, how is informational efficiency impacted? One
possibility is that human biases are reduced, information is processed faster and in larger volumes,
leading to improved price discovery and higher informational efficiency. Yet another possibility is
that as machines replace humans, some of the “soft” information that humans (but not machines)
are able to interpret is lost and consequently prices become less informative. While humans make
a range of errors in interpreting information, machines are also not infallible, and they too can
make different errors. Which of these opposing effects dominates is an empirical question that has
broad implications for the functioning of financial markets and ultimately the efficient allocation of
resources and risk.
We analyze the impact of machines on informational efficiency using a unique dataset in which
we can distinguish between when a machine reads information released by a company versus when
a human accesses the same information. We take the event-level Form 8-K viewership data from
the SEC’s EDGAR server. The Form 8-K filings are the means through which companies notify
the market of important unscheduled corporate events including changes to a material agreement,
financial information, acquisitions, substantial impairments, and any other events deemed important
to shareholders. What distinguishes our paper from other studies of these company filings is that
we separate each viewership of an 8-K filing into machine viewers and human viewers based on the
downloading behavior captured by the server logs.1 We further partition viewership at the level of
the viewer’s computing facility using IP addresses. No prior study to the best of our knowledge has
examined material information acquisition at this granular level.
1Following the previous literature (Drake et al., 2015; Ryans, 2017), we identify information acquisition by a machine
when the acquiring entity consistently downloads a large volume of 8-K filings beyond human comprehension within a
short period of time.
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First we show that machine viewership of 8-K filings has experienced significant growth in recent
years.2 Total machine viewership increases from 0.57 million views in 2008 to 8.78 million views in
2016, while total human viewership remains stable with an average of 0.3 million views per year.
The viewership from cloud computing services, such as Amazon Web Services, was only 1% of the
machine viewership before 2008, and the same figure increased to 14% in 2008, to 35% in 2012, and
to 62% in 2016. This rapid growth coincides with the increase in popularity of both quantitative
investment strategies, whose trading volume grew from 20% to 36% of institutional volume between
2014 and 2019, and cloud computing services, which offer many unique benefits to machine-based
investment strategies, such as anonymity, stability, and minimum on-site maintenance.3
To understand the differences between how machines and humans access information, we compare
their determinants. As expected, both human and machine viewers pay more attention to timely
and complex 8-K. However, human viewers tend to focus on large and value firms, suggesting that
human viewers pay more attention to well-known and mature firms. On the other hand, machine
viewers have no preference for the type of firms, which is consistent with machines having less
capacity constraints compared to humans that are forced to ration their scarce cognitive ability and
attention. Human viewers also focus more on firms with fewer institutional shareholders that put
considerable effort into monitoring firms and enhancing their disclosure transparency. The number
of analysts following a firm does not have a significant impact on machine versus human viewership,
suggesting that analyst coverage does not necessarily affect investors’ attention and demand for
information. Interestingly, human viewers have a tendency for increased viewership of 8-K filings
that have negative sentiment content, but machines are indifferent to the sentiment of the 8-K.
A noticeable difference between machines and humans that helps explain our findings is the
type of information that they choose to focus on. A useful feature of the 8-K filings is that they
arrange events into topical categories. We find that while human viewers pay significantly more
attention to earnings information (item 2.02), machine viewers pay significantly more attention to
2An article in The Economist on December 21, 2020, states that “For most of the past decade more trades have
been done at high frequency by complex algorithms than by humans.”
3Due to technological advances and market structure developments in recent decades, computer-based trading
including algorithmic and high frequency trading account for the majority of trading in current financial markets (e.g.,
75% of trading volume in the US in 2009 (Hendershott et al., 2011)).
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corporate events not listed by the SEC but deemed material non-public information by the firm
(item 8.01). These results are consistent with the notion that the greater computational capacity of
machine-based strategies allow them to digest a broader set of unanticipated but important events
that human viewers may neglect due to limited attention or limited cognitive capacity.
To quantify the impact of machines on informational efficiency, we measure the magnitude of
absolute price drift following the 8-K publication date over the windows (2, 10), (2, 20), and (2, 40)
(relative to the 8-K publication date). Relatively more human viewership during the window t ∈
{0, 1} is significantly associated with increased price drift following the 8-K publication date across
various windows, consistent with an inefficient assimilation of the information. On the contrary,
relatively more machine viewership, particularly from cloud machine services, is associated with more
efficient incorporation of the information and no significant price drift following the 8-K publication
date. This evidence is robust in all three event windows, various fixed effects, and remain qualitatively
similar with alternative ways to define drifts. The results are also robust to an alternative measure
based on a variance decomposition that separates noise and information. In terms of economic
significance, a one-standard-deviation increase in the human viewership (holding fixed the level of
machine viewership) yields about a 13.23% aggregate increase in the price drift in the month following
the 8-K publication.
We further partition machine viewership (using IP addresses) into six categories: cloud computing
services, financial institutions, data & media publishers, auditing & law firms, internet services
providers, and a diverse group of other entities not related to the investment industry. This allows
us to separate machine viewership that is unrelated machine-based investment strategies. We find
that machine viewership from cloud computing services (most likely to be associated with machine-
based investment strategies) has the strongest impact on stock price informational efficiency, being
negatively related to post 8-K price drift. A one standard deviation increase in machine viewership
from cloud services leads to a 10.49% aggregate reduction in price-drift over the month after 8-
K filing date. Surprisingly, the machine viewership from financial institutions is not significantly
related to post-event price drift, suggesting that the more sophisticated machine-driven investment
strategies tend to be deployed via cloud computing servers and not via IP addresses known to belong
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to financial firms.
To examine whether the relations between machine viewership and informational efficiency reflect
causal effects of machines, we use three identification strategies: instrumental variables, exogenous
cloud and power outages, and a quasi-natural experiment. Our first approach is a two-stage least-
squares (2SLS) estimation in which human (and machine) viewership is instrumented by market
sentiment and macroeconomic news, which disproportionately affect human ability to assimilate
information. Our second approach exploits exogenous disruptions to machines from cloud service
and major power outage events. Our third approach uses the firm’s inclusion in the S&P500 index
as a quasi-natural experiment. Inclusion events lead to a sudden surge in viewership primarily from
human analysts and fund managers who, unlike machines, have limited capacity to follow stocks
outside of major indices (Farboodi et al., 2020). The results from all three of these identification
strategies support the notion that machines cause an improvement in informational efficiency.
What is it that machines do better than humans to result in improved informational efficiency?
We test several potential mechanisms. First, we investigate whether machines are better than humans
at comprehending information when it is presented in a complex manner. Consistent with our
conjecture, we find that machine viewership lessens the post-event price drift among the 8-Ks that
are linguistically more complex from the perspective of a human. Second, machines may be less
susceptible to human biases. Previous literature, such as Tetlock (2007), documents that media
pessimism leads to inefficient price reactions as human traders show behaviors expected of noise
traders. We find support for the notion that machines improve informational efficiency by being less
susceptible to such biases — i.e., machine views have greater market efficiency improvements among
the 8-Ks containing more negative sentiment.
The third mechanism that we examine is how well machines perform relative to humans in
combining incremental signals in an 8-K filing with existing signals outside a given 8-K. Dugast and
Foucault (2018) show that there is a trade-off between fast and automated decision-making versus
slower but deeper analysis, which is potentially where humans might have an edge over machines.
Our tests use item 2.02 of the 8-Ks, which usually reveals more precise information regarding the
same earnings events that have been preliminarily disclosed in a press release. Our analysis indicates
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that the human, not machine, viewership of item 2.02 is associated with less price drift, consistent
with our conjecture that humans have an advantage in deeper analysis that involves combining
multiple sequential signals that have a degree of overlap.
Lastly, we examine whether the positive effects of cloud computing machines are due to better
information processing (machines making informed decisions) or faster information processing, or
both. We find that machine viewership is significantly positively related to measures of informed
trading following the 8-K publication date, whereas for humans we get the opposite result. Our
analysis also suggests that the cloud-machine viewership of 8-Ks is significantly associated with
increased algorithmic trading activity around the information release, based on odd lot and trade
size proxies. Therefore, the evidence is consistent with machines having an advantage in both the
accuracy of information processing and speed.
Our paper makes two important contributions to the information disclosure literature. Prior
research on information acquisition via SEC filings considers human heterogeneity and how it affects
the informational efficiency of prices (Drake et al., 2015; Dyer, 2019). Another strand of litera-
ture proposes various machine learning models to show that computationally-intensive quantitative
strategies can generate superior performance compared to traditional asset pricing models (Gu et al.,
2020). They do not, however, investigate how information-based quantitative investment strategies
impact the price discovery process. We fill this void by examining the impact of machine viewer-
ship of information on the price discovery process and find that quantitative investment strategies,
especially those implemented through cloud computing services, help improve market efficiency.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on price informativeness by examining the specific
mechanism of information acquisition by different types of investors in a casual setup. Prior studies
suggest that sophisticated investors improve stock price efficiency (Akbas et al., 2015; Kokkonen
and Suominen, 2015; Cao et al., 2018). Recent literature focuses on investors’ capability of handling
information and studies their impact on market efficiency. Chen et al. (2020b), for example, document
that aggressive trades by hedge funds, based on acquired information from the SEC’s EDGAR server,
mitigates the impairment of market efficiency caused by analyst coverage reductions. Begenau et al.
(2018) argue that certain investors can process larger data more effectively and therefore help price
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assets of firms with big data more accurately. Our paper expands this line of research by showing
that information acquisition by machine-based investment strategies impacts post-announcement
price drift differently from information acquisition by humans.
2. Theoretical Framework
Several branches of the literature help understand how machines could impact informational efficiency
and the channels through which those effects occur. The related theory includes rational expectations
models of endogenous information acquisition at one end, through to recent models of competing
algorithmic investors and traders at the other. Also relevant are studies that analyze the relative
efficacy of machine learning methods in assimilating information about stocks.
2.1. How do machines impact informational efficiency?
A key insight from rational expectations models is that when information acquisition and processing
is costly, stock prices only partially reflect the available information and hence investor efforts in
becoming informed are compensated (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985, 1989; Admati and
Pfleiderer, 1988).4 A direct consequence is that a reduction in the cost of information acquisition
and processing will tend to increase the amount of information acquisition and improve stock price
informativeness. Advances in computing and automation reduce the marginal costs of information
acquisition and processing. Therefore, the first effect we expect as machines become more prevalent
in investment settings is more information acquisition, likely accompanied by better informational
efficiency of prices.
Recent studies of the role of machines and machine learning in financial markets argue that
the cost of gathering and analyzing information has declined as machines replace humans. For
example, machines have greater economies of scale in gathering and processing information (Chen
et al., 2020a). Increased computational power and the use of machine learning algorithms can allow
investors to outperform traditional empirical asset pricing models (Gu et al., 2020), make use of
4Sims (2003, 2006) further argues that investors’ limited information-processing capacity discourages the information
assimilation process into stock prices.
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highly unstructured textual data (Bybee et al., 2020), and front-run slower traders (Van Kervel and
Menkveld, 2019).
A wide range of behavioural and information processing effects are also relevant in understand-
ing the effects of replacing humans with machines in financial markets. Machine-based strategies
that make investment decisions following rules extrapolated from data may be less susceptible to
factors that bias human decision-making including emotions, heuristics, and impulsiveness. They
are also likely to be faster than humans, especially for demanding and complex tasks (Sims, 2003,
2006; Bradshaw et al., 2020).5 Studies of heterogeneity among humans show that investors have
different information-processing models and, in turn, respond to identical public signals differently
(Xiong, 2013). Humans also trade for non-investment rationales.6 Presumably due to these reasons,
quantitative and machine-driven investors have grown rapidly and in 2019 account for approximately
36% of institutional stock trading volume and manage around 35% of US equity.7
In sum, given the potential for machines and machine learning methods to reduce information ac-
quisition and processing costs (Chen et al., 2020a) and produce faster, less biased trading decisions
based on firm-specific information (Sims, 2003, 2006; Peng, 2005; Veldkamp, 2006), our main hy-
pothesis is: Machine viewership of company information (SEC’s Form 8-K) increases informational
efficiency (relative to human viewership) and decreases the price drift following the 8-K publication.
2.2. Shortcomings of machines and potential negative effects
Machines, like humans, are not infallible. Practitioners and academics have expressed concerns that
computationally intensive black-box algorithms may end up identifying spurious correlations or data
biases, and under-performing traditional methods in the long-run.8 Critics have also argued that
machine learning methods produce strategies that appear profitable, but load on difficult-to-arbitrage
5Bradshaw et al. (2020) argue that soft news is relatively more costly to process than hard news and markets are
likely to react more strongly to analysts’ processing of soft news than of hard news as hard news is more likely to have
already been factored into prices.
6For example, Barber and Odean (2002) argue that overconfident traders can cause markets to underreact to the
informational content of rational traders. Another strand of studies has identified numerous behavioral rationales
for over-trading, including entertainment (Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009), sensation seeking (Barber and Odean, 2008;
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009), gambling (Kumar, 2009; Cookson, 2018), and learning by doing (Linnainmaa, 2011).
7Anonymous. “March of the machines. The stock market is now run by computers” The Economist, Oct 5th 2019.
8For example, see Mark Hulbert (2020, Jan 5). Use AI for Picking Stocks? Not So Fast. Wall Street Journal.
Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com.
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stocks and therefore often fail when trading costs and other frictions are taken into consideration
(Avramov et al., 2020). Moreover, machines are limited in their capacity to process soft information,
compared to humans (Bradshaw et al., 2020).
Dugast and Foucault (2018) show that there is a trade-off between using information to make
quick and automated decisions versus making slower and more deliberated decisions. The quick
and automated decisions (reflecting machine-driven investment) have the advantage of acting on
information faster and thereby reaping the profits of acting ahead of slower investors, but at the cost
of sometimes making substantial errors that are more severe than those of slower and more deliberated
decision-making. The slower and more deliberated decision-making of humans can benefit from the
use of soft information and from combining low and high precision signals received at different points
in time. It is therefore possible that while machines may speed up price discovery, they also introduce
new types of errors into the price discovery process.
Another potential downside, which has been explored in the algorithmic trading literature, such
as Weller (2017), is that automated models may have an adverse effect on stock price informativeness,
despite their importance for transmitting available information into prices. For example, Baldauf
and Mollner (2020) find that faster speeds enable high-frequency traders (HFT) to be more successful
at order anticipation, which can have a negative effect on information production due to informed
traders having less time to trade before HFTs react. Lee and Watts (2020) find that when the
SEC’s “Tick Size Pilot” increased the tick size and reduced algorithmic trading, pre-announcement
stock returns are better able to predict the news of the upcoming earnings release, consistent with
improved price discovery.9
Automated investment models that rely on fast processing of big data may not improve the price
efficiency for stocks without large quantities of machine-readable data. For example, Begenau et al.
(2018) investigate whether investors more efficiently price firms with big data. They find that big
data disproportionately benefits large firms, allowing investors to produce more accurate forecasts
and reduce uncertainty, which ultimately reduces the firm’s cost of capital. In a similar spirit,
9On the contrary, Chordia and Miao (2020) use comprehensive intraday data and find that low-latency trading
improves the long-term informational efficiency of stock prices.
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Farboodi et al. (2020) find that the informativeness of stock prices, measured using the method
proposed by Bai et al. (2016), varies significantly across groups of stocks, with large and growth
stock prices increasingly reflecting information about future earnings. Therefore, there are potential
negative effects from the tendency for machines to replace humans making it even more important
to empirically test our main hypothesis.
2.3. Mechanisms and channels
Given that there are potentially both positive and negative effects of machines on informational
efficiency, an important question is under what conditions the positive effects are likely to dominate?
We begin with the issue of machine-readability. Hwang and Kim (2017) document that issuing finan-
cial disclosure documents with low readability causes firms to trade at significant discounts relative
to their fundamentals. They argue that firms with difficult-to-read documents could evoke feelings
of uncertainty and distrust among investors. In contrast, automated strategies lack such subjective
components in their decision making processes. Cao et al. (2020) find that increased machine down-
loading activity motivates firms to prepare filings according to machines’ readership and processing
capability. This would further differentiate the impact of readability on the information assimilation
speed of automated models from that of human readers. Therefore, we expect the positive effect of
automated strategies on stock price efficiency to be pronounced when machines gather and analyze
the information in 8-Ks that are difficult for humans to read.
Another strand of the literature suggests that investor sentiment affects stock prices. Tetlock
(2007) uses the daily content from a popular Wall Street Journal column to proxy for investor
sentiment and finds that high media pessimism predicts short-run downward pressure in stock prices.
Garćıa (2013) uses the Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) dictionaries to measure the sentiment of New
York Times articles, and finds that sentiment predicts stock returns during recessions. While the
above studies show that investor sentiment impacts stock prices, it remains an open question whether
machines are less susceptible to being influenced by negative sentiment. We hypothesize that the
positive impact of machines on stock price efficiency is stronger when the information disclosure
contains negative sentiment or takes place on negative sentiment days, which is when human decisions
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are most likely to be biased by sentiment.
Lastly, recent studies have theoretically investigated whether lower information processing cost
and increased information transparency lead to more precise signals. Dugast and Foucault (2018)
suggest that lower costs of gathering corporate disclosures (by machines) can cause a decline in the
equilibrium demand for more precise signals about fundamentals, such as those that require more
effort and deeper analysis. Humans may have an advantage over machines in slower but deeper
analysis that combines sequential pieces of information. Hence, we expect that machines will not
improve stock price efficiency or could even harm it when it comes to the sequential arrival of
information that lends itself to a deeper analysis by human experts.
3. Data and Summary Statistics
We first describe our data sources and the variables used in our analysis. We then provide an
overview of the cloud computing services that have revolutionised modern financial systems. Lastly,
we provide descriptive statistics of the key variables.
3.1. Data sources and identifying machines vs humans
Our sample is made up of all firms in the CRSP and Compustat universe during a 14 year period
from January 2003 to December 2016. We collect data on each viewing (referred to as a visit) of
each 8-K filing (a notification to investors of an unscheduled material or extraordinary event that is
important to shareholders) from the SEC’s EDGAR server, giving us nearly 4 billion visits.10 Each
observation contains a partially anonymized IP address, time stamp, HTTP status codes (e.g., 200
for successful delivery), and crawler flag.11 We obtain 8-K filings from WRDS SEC Analytics Suite
(approximately 1.2 million 8-K filings). We restrict our sample to the filings that match firms in the
CRSP and Compustat universe through the CIK-GVKEY link provided by WRDS SEC-Suite.
10To be precise, we have 3,966,935,088 visits to 1,203,881 8-K filings issued between January 2003 and December
2016. We remove the visits that fail to retrieve documents from EDGAR server (HTTP code6=200), only visit index
page (index dummy= 1) that come from search engines, and other similar web crawlers (crawler= 1).
11The raw files also include filing-specific information: Central Index Key (CIK) used in SEC’s EDGAR server to
identify filers, accession numbers that uniquely match a specific SEC filing, and files visited (e.g., exhibits or index
file).
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To protect the privacy and intellectual property of the filing viewers, the SEC redacts the last
octet in their IP addresses. Similar to Chen et al. (2020a), we match IP addresses to organizations
using a dataset from MaxMind by the first three octets in the IP address. In our sample, the
proportion of the IP addresses that share the same first three IP octets, but come from different
organizations, is small (3.46%). When multiple organizations are assigned to a redacted IP address,
we use the organizations associated with most IP addresses within the anonymized octet for the IP
address.
Next, we categorize the organizations of 8-K viewers into seven groups using data from Thomson
Reuters Global Ownership and Capital IQ. The former data set contains approximately 1.6 million
(financial) institutional investors and investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and hedge funds.
The latter contains approximately 14.2 million public and private firms, as well as their subsidiaries.
We label institutional investors and funds as “Institutional Investors” based on industry type from
both databases, while we group the remaining organizations into “Auditing & Law Firms”, “Clouding
Services”, “Media & Data Vendors”, “Educations & Regulators”, “Internet Services Providers” and
“Others”.12
We use two approaches to separate human viewership from machine viewership. We first follow
Drake et al. (2015) to define visits from the IP addresses with any downloads per minute greater
than 5, or IP addresses with more than 1,000 downloads per day as machine visits. Then, we follow
Dechow et al. (2015) to count the visits from IP addresses with any downloads per minute greater
than 25, or with the number of CIK’s downloaded per minute being greater than 3, or with more
than 500 downloads during the day as machine visits.
For each 8-K filing in our sample, we obtain the report date (Conformed Period of Report), the
12To facilitate the matching between the MaxMind’s organization and entity names and the other two data sets,
we use a fuzzy-name matching algorithm developed by WRDS, which involves human validation through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. To separate Internet Service Provider and Cloud Computing from other technology firms (in order
to identify unmatched entitles), we first rely on Google to obtain the URL and short text results in the top 10 hits. We
only search the organizations that have visited the EDGAR server for 8-K at least 100 times in our sample period. For
the ones we cannot identify, we rely on Wikipedia and organizations’ website that is obtained from the first 10 Google
search hits. Our manual search allows us to reduce the visits from IP addresses from entities categorized as “Others”,
including entities from IP addresses that remain unidentified after manual searching, as well as the industries outside
the remaining six categories. These exclusions account to be less than 3.86% of total 8-K visits in our final sample. The
Appendix Table B reports top 10 Organizations of “Cloud Computing”, “Institutional Investors”, “Internet Provider
Services”, and “Others”.
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filing date, the SEC release date, the item type, and the text of the 8-K filing, including the text
from any attached exhibits (Item 9.01). Almost all 8-K filings must be reported within four business
days of the event date, with a very small number of exceptions (Ben-Rephael et al., 2020). To focus
on the 8-K filings that carry new information, we limit the sample to filings that contain events that
are released within four business days from the event date.13
We also use a number of other data sources. We obtain stock price data from CRSP and funda-
mental data from Compustat. We use I/B/E/S to for analyst coverage, and 13F data from Refinitive
for ownership. We obtain the S&P500 inclusion dates from CRSP, quarterly earnings announcement
dates from Compustat, could service from Gunawi et al. (2016) and power outage event data from
Mukherjee et al. (2018).14 To calculate the directional trading and algorithmic trading measures, we
use NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) and the SEC’s Market Information Data and Analytics System
(MIDAS) available through WRDS. All variables are defined in the Appendix Table A.
3.2. Construction of efficiency measures
The absolute cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969)
is a standard measure of the incorporation of information into prices. This measure constructs














where ri,t is the raw return of stock i on date t and αi and βi,k are estimated from a regression of k
mimicking portfolios. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) cumulates the abnormal return from
announcement date t = 0 to T , and the ACAR is the absolute value of this number. The ACAR(0, T )
measures the announcement information that enters prices through the announcement day to the
day T . To measure the drift components of the information integrated into price, we proceed along
13On August 23, 2004, the SEC redefined qualifying events that trigger 8-K filers and accelerated the 8-K publication
date. For more information about this rule see the SEC Financial Reporting Releases Nos. 33-8400 and 34-49424. To
ensure data consistency, we match the items defined in the previous version of 8-K filings to the ones in the post-2004
version over our sample period.
14Gunawi et al. (2016) collects the cloud service outage from 2009 to 2015. We follow their method to obtain
complementary cloud service outage events from 2003 through to 2016. Besides, we drop the outage events cloud
service related to gaming (e.g., Play Station), business storage (e.g., Salesforce), and social media (e.g., Facebook). We
also manually collect the major power outage events in the second half of 2016 from Google to complement Mukherjee
et al. (2018), which provides the outage data from January 2000 to July 2016.
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the lines of Meulbroek (1992) and take the difference between total post-event cumulative abnormal
return and those over a short window post to 8-K announcement. Specifically, we use the absolute
difference between post-announcement price variation and variation over a short window right after
the announcement:
DRIFT (2, T ) =
∣∣∣∣CAR0,Ti,t − CAR0,1i,t ∣∣∣∣ (2)
with T > 1 to capture post announcement drift.
For robustness, as an alternative measure of inefficiency in how information is incorporated into
prices, we use the noise return variance from Brogaard et al. (2021), which is based on a variance
decomposition model. Furthermore, we also use alternative machine viewership measures, i.e. the
fraction of machine viewership. All results remain qualitatively similar.
3.3. Summary statistics
Figure (1) plots annual number of visits in our sample by machine and human viewers, as well as
the total number of visits. Figure (1) depicts the exponential growth of machine viewership of 8-K
since 2007, whereas human viewership of 8-K has maintained its relatively low level over time.
Cloud computing services, such as Amazon Web Services, enable largely anonymous, on-demand
network access to computing services over the Internet. These services include data backup, disaster
recovery, machine learning, and big data analytics. Cloud computing services can protect users’
identities, avoid internet service disruption, and access servers from the desired geographic locations.
Therefore, cloud computing services are appealing to various financial institutions that otherwise need
to maintain an in-house computing center. The technology hurdle to deploying investment strategies
through cloud computing and the cost associated with its features mentioned above establish barriers
to entry for less sophisticated investors to benefit from cloud computing. The trends in viewership
of 8-K filings by cloud computing services are consistent with the overall trends of cloud computing
development in recent years. As illustrated in Figure (2), cloud computing viewership represented
only 1% of the machine viewership before 2008, 14% in 2008, 35% in 2012, and 62% in 2016.
Therefore, cloud computing is an important means of information acquisition and processing, which
is expected to directly affect market efficiency.
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Table (1) provides the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, median, and the 25th
and 75th percentiles of our key variables. To focus on the immediate viewership right after the 8-K
announcement date, we restrict our sample to the visits on the SEC’s 8-K filing day and the day
following (t ∈ {0, 1}). This leaves us with 551,054 8-K filings with all main control variables available.
Among other notable statistics reported in Panel A, machines view more 8-K filings (log viewership
of 3.34 and 3.29, based on Drake et al. (2015) and Dechow et al. (2015) methods, respectively), on
average, compared to humans (log viewership of 1.05 and 1.34, based on Drake et al. (2015) and
Dechow et al. (2015) methods, respectively). The median and standard deviation of both groups
indicate that machines are far more active in viewing 8-Ks than humans. Among other statistics
reported in Panel A, the average firm size is about $6.5m while the average book-to-market ratio is
0.75. The average institutional holding is 61%, with 4.1 analysts covering the firm, on average. Panel
B reports viewership broken down into six item types that appear in 8-K filings. The most frequently
viewed is item 2.02, which is largely related to quarterly and annual earnings announcements. The
mean (median) 2-day viewership of a filing with item 2.02 is 69.91 (41) views.
Panel C reports viewership broken down by the viewer type using seven categories defined in
Section (3.1). Viewership from “Cloud Computing” and “Internet Provider” are considerably greater
than those from the “Rest” of organization types. The proportion of machine viewership from Cloud
Computing (Others) is 98.33% (46.02%), the highest (lowest) among all seven categories. The total
viewership per organization is heavily skewed. For example, the average number of 8-K views per
Cloud Computing organization is 13,780, while the median is only 10 views with a standard deviation
of 204,000. This indicates the 8-K viewership is highly concentrated – there is a small number of
highly active viewers. Figure (2) plots the number of views by organization.
4. Machine and Human Viewership
We begin by investigating the factors that affect the variation in machine and human viewership of
firm i’s 8-K on days t ∈ {0, 1}, relative to the 8-K publication date. We then analyze the impact of
machine and human viewership on informational efficiency. Next, we address endogeneity concerns
using a quasi-natural experiment, exogenous shocks, and instrumental variables. Finally, we examine
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the channels driving the results.
4.1. Determinants of machine or human viewership activity of 8-K
To understand the drivers of Machine and Human viewership we estimate the following regression:
VM,Hi,t = α0 +
k∑
j=1
ϕjΓi,j,t + f̃ + τ̃ + εi,t (3)
where VM,Hi,t is our measures of the number of 8-K views by machines or humans or both (to-
tal visits) on days t ∈ {0, 1}. The control variables, Γi,j,t, include several firm characteristics,
market conditions, and 8-K characteristics (indexed by j), at time t, such as the negative senti-
ment (FinNeg) content in the 8-K, the Fog readability (FOG), the word count of text in the 8-K
(WordCount), the days-to-release that captures the number of days between the event date and
the 8-K filing date (DaysRelease), the number of items in the 8-K (#Item), the firm ′sbook −
to−marketratio(BM), thefirm’s size (SIZE), firm i’s institutional ownership (InstOwn), and the
number of analysts following the firm i (Analysts). All variables are defined in the Appendix Table
A. f̃ and τ̃ are firm and year fixed effects, respectively.
Table (2) reports the results of these regressions. Column (1) shows that 8-K filings with con-
siderable negative sentiment content tend to receive more total visits, as reflected by the positive,
though marginally significant, FinNeg coefficient. This tendency is strongest for humans (Columns
3 and 5) and is insignificant for machines (Columns 2 and 4). These results suggest that negative
sentiment content tends to attract more attention from human viewers, possibly due to emotional
effects for human investors. Column (1) also shows that larger 8-Ks are more likely to have a sig-
nificantly larger total number of visits, as proxied by the word count in the 8-K (WordCount) and
the number of items included in the 8-K (#Item). Larger 8-Ks are likely to reveal more material
information. As a result, both machines and humans more actively view larger 8-Ks (Columns 2-5).
Column (1) also shows that timely 8-Ks are likely to receive more attention, as the number of days
between the event date and the 8-K publication date (DayRelease) is negatively related to total
viewership.
Table (2) also shows that larger firms (SIZE) have greater human viewership (Columns 3 and
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5) but not significantly greater machine viewership (Columns 2 and 4). This result suggests that
human readers tend to download the filings of larger and perhaps more established corporations with
longer histories than those of smaller firms, consistent with Cao et al. (2020). Columns (3 and 5) also
reveal that value firms (BM) have greater human viewership but not significantly greater machine
viewership (Columns 2 and 4). Similarly, humans pay more attention to the 8-Ks of firms with low
institutional ownership (InstOwn), which are likely to lack information transparency, yet machines
show no preference over those firms. These findings are consistent with prior studies highlighting the
implications of two commonly understood differences between humans and machines, which are due
to their capacity and rationality (Abis, 2020).
We partition 8-K filings into topical categories based on the items contained within the 8-K and
examine how human and machine viewership varies across the topical categories.15 We regress the
measures of human or machine viewership on a set of dummy variables for the different 8-K item
types and control for the same factors as in Table (2).16
Table (3) reports the results of those regressions. They show that there is significant heterogeneity
in the viewing activity of the different items in the 8-K by machines and humans. For example,
column (1) shows that machines do not pay significant attention to item 2.02 that mostly refers to
non-GAAP earning disclosures, as reflected in the insignificant item 2.02 coefficient. In contrast,
humans pay significant attention to item 2.02 (column 6). Humans may have a particular preference
for events that convey certain and well-known types of information, but machine viewers do not
have such preference. Columns (2) and (7) show that machines, but not humans, pay significantly
more attention to item 8.01 (i.e., Other Events). These results are consistent with the notion that
machines rely on their ample computational capacity to identify material information that is not
standardized in a typical, anticipated 8-K. Human viewers, in contrast, are more likely to target
specific information disclosure events rather unspecified ones.
Humans tend to pay less attention to item 5.02, relative to other items in 8-K filings (Column 9).
15We focus on the five most common categories. As suggested by Panel B of Table 1, the rest of the categories
altogether are around 13.15% of 8-K categories in our sample.
16While the main results are based on the measures of machine and human viewership proposed by Ryans (Ryans,
2017), in an unreported table we repeat the tests with the DRT measures (Drake et al., 2015) and find similar results.
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Therefore, human readers appear to be less attentive to unanticipated events related to the departure
or election of officers or directors. In contrast, machines do not significantly under allocate attention
to item 5.02. Lastly, the total viewership by both machines and humans is higher for voluntary
disclosure items 7.01 (i.e., Regulation FD Disclosure) and mandatory disclosure item 1.01 (i.e., Entry
into a Material Definitive Agreement) as reported in columns (3, 5, 8, and 10).
In summary, our findings are consistent with the notion that humans and machines scrutinize
specific 8-K items differently. Our results suggest that automated models are more attentive to new
information disclosed in non-standardized 8-K items.
4.2. Viewership and market efficiency
In this section we investigate the effect of machine and human viewership activity of 8-K on the
underlying firm’s stock price efficiency. We hypothesize that machines will contribute to a faster
and more efficient reaction of stock prices to new information. Therefore, we expect that the price
drift following 8-K releases will be larger when there is a greater prevalence of humans relative to
machines reading the filing. Among machines, we expect that the investors using cloud computing
services are likely to be among the most sophisticated and therefore will have the largest positive
impact on informational efficiency.
We estimate the following regression:








ϕjΓi,j,t + f̃ + τ̃ + εi,t (4)
where DRIFT (2, T )i,t is a measure of inefficiency defined as the absolute difference between post-
announcement price variation and variation over a short window right after the announcement, as
described in Equation (2). VM,Hi,t is our measures of the 8-K viewership by machines or humans.
The control variables, Γi,j,t, include several firm and 8-K filing characteristics, such as firm i’s book-
to-market ratio, size, return-on-assets, leverage, standard deviation of monthly return over the year
prior to the 8-K, institutional ownership concentration, and analyst coverage. All variables are
defined in the Appendix Table A. f̃ and τ̃ are firm and year fixed effects, respectively.
Table (4) reports the results. Columns (1-3) provide the first evidence that the price drift
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following the 8-K publication date is mainly associated with human viewership of the 8-K, rather
than by aggregated machine viewership. In particular, column (1) shows that the aggregate machine
viewership (including all categories of machines) of 8-K has no significant effect on the price drift
following the 8-K publication date, as shown by the insignificant Machine coefficient. In contrast,
column (2) shows that 8-K viewership by humans has a positive and highly significant effect on
the price drift. Column (3) simultaneously accounts for viewership by machines and humans and
confirms the findings reported in columns (1-2).
In columns (4-6) of Table (4) we extend our analysis by increasing the DRIFT (2, T ) window
from DRIFT (2, 10) to DRIFT (2, 20), and in column (7-9) to DRIFT (2, 40), with the same control
variables. We find consistent and even stronger evidence regarding the impact of viewership by
machines and humans on the price drift.17 We also examine an alternative measure of inefficiency
in Section (4.4) and find similar results. The effects of human viewership on the price drift are also
economically significant. For example, a one standard deviation increase in human viewership is
associated with a 13.23% aggregate increase in the price drift over the post-publication month.18
Therefore, the well-established inefficiencies from overreaction and underreaction to information in
financial markets is driven by humans and not machines.
The regressions control for several firm characteristics. Across all columns (1-9) we find that firm
size and ROA are negatively related to the price drift post to 8-K filing date suggesting that larger
and more profitable firms have more efficient prices. Consistent with Ben-Rephael et al. (2020),
columns (1-9) show a negative and highly significant relation between the institutional ownership
and the price drift post to 8-K filing date, with the coefficient of InstOwn ranging between -0.012
and -0.022 (significant at the 1% confidence level).19
17We also repeat our analysis with an alternative machine viewership, which is defined as the fraction of machine or
cloud machine viewership to total visits. The results, reported in the Appendix Table C are qualitatively similar. We
also repeat all tests with the machine and human viewership measured by the DRT (Drake et al., 2015) method and
the results are qualitatively similar.
18The standard deviation of raw human visits in the first two days is 51.96, and its log is ln(1 + 51.96) = 3.97. Given
average number of post-event price drift, DRIFT (2, 20) is 0.09, one standard deviation increase in human visits leads
a 13.23% (0.003$× $3.97/0.09) increase in post-event price drift.
19In their analysis of abnormal institutional attention and price discovery during the filing period, Ben-Rephael
et al. (2020) find that price discovery prior to the filing period is 9.7% higher when institutional investors are paying
attention, which ultimately results in a reduction of 9.7% in the subsequent price discovery during the filing period.
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4.3. Machine viewership, hosting facilities, and price drift
Machines are far from a monolithic group. In fact, a considerable proportion of machine-based
viewership is not directly associated with sophisticated investors, nor with investment strategies (such
as viewership from university, regulators, and auditing firms). Furthermore, as we discussed above,
we expect that the investors using cloud computing are likely to be among the most sophisticated and
therefore will have the largest positive impact on informational efficiency. We test these differences
between types of machines by using the different categories that we identified on the basis of the
machine’s IP address: (a) cloud computing services, (b) financial institutions, (c) data & media
publishers, and (d) a combined type (others) for those entities not associated with the professional
investment practice, including auditing & law firms, internet services providers, and a diverse group
for the entities. We regress the inefficiency measure, DRIFT (2, T )i,t, on measures of viewership by
each of the machine types. We include the same control variables as before: BM , SIZE, ROA,
LEV , STDRET , InstOwn, and Analysts.
Table (5) reports the results from this analysis. The results (columns (1) and (5)) show that
machine viewership from cloud computing services does indeed have a significant positive association
with informational efficiency (negative association with drift). In terms of economic significance,
a one standard deviation increase in the machine-based viewership of 8-K from cloud computing
services is associated with a 10.49% aggregate decrease in the price drift over the post-filing month.20
Extending the price drift window up to 40 trading days following the 8-K publication date, the
machine viewership of 8-K from cloud computing services is no longer statistically significant although
the point estimate remains the same. These results are consistent with more variability and less
statistical power in the longer horizon measure, or that investors using cloud computing services
tend to exploit their informational advantage over a short-term horizon.
The estimates in columns (2), (6), and (10) of Table (5) show that machine viewership from
financial institutions other than those using cloud computing facilities (InstMachine) and machine
20The unreported standard deviation of raw machine visits from clouding services in the first two days is 110.98, and
its log is ln(1 + 110.98) = 4.72. Given average number of post-event price drift, DRIFT (2, 20), is 0.09, one standard
deviation increase in machine visits from cloud services leads a 10.49% (= 0.002 × 4.72/0.09) decrease in post-event
price drift.
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viewership from data & media publishers (DataMachine) does not have a significant effect on the
price drift. Viewership from other machine types (OtherMachine) is positively associated with
inefficiency as measured by price drift.21
4.4. Evidence from alternative measures
To test the robustness of our main results, we re-estimate the regressions from the previous subsec-
tions but using a different measure of information (in)efficiency – the Noise measure developed by
Brogaard et al. (2021). This measure is the standard deviation of estimated pricing errors obtained
from a variance decomposition model that separates information and noise. It captures both under-
reaction and overreaction to information as two forms of inefficiency that contribute to “noise” in
prices. In a series of validation tests, Brogaard et al. (2021) show that the Noise measure captures
informational inefficiency in prices.
Similar to the previous subsections, we regress Noise on measures of viewership by each of the
machine types and include the same control variables as before. The results support the conclusions
made based on the drift measure.22 Specifically, human viewership has a significant positive asso-
ciation with noise in prices, while cloud computing machine viewership has a significant negative
association with noise. These results therefore support the notion that access to information by
machines operating from cloud computing services tends to improve the informational efficiency of
prices.
5. Addressing Endogeneity
While the evidence so far is consistent with our main hypothesis, to more formally examine the
causality between human/machine access to information and informational efficiency, we exploit
three identification strategies: (a) instrumental variables, (b) exogenous shocks, and (c) a quasi-
natural experiment.
21Once again, in an unreported table in which we repeat our tests with the machine-based viewership defined by
DRT (Drake et al., 2015), the results are qualitatively similar.
22The results are reported in the Appendix Table D.
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5.1. Instrumental variables approach
We first address potential endogeneity using a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) framework in which
machine or human viewership is instrumented by various market sentiment proxies and macroeco-
nomic news. Our tests are based on the notion that investor sentiment (measured using the index of
Baker and Wurgler (2006)), macroeconomic news announcements (Peng and Xiong, 2006; Kacper-
czyk et al., 2016), changes in the V IX during the window (−20,−1) relative to 8-K publication date,
and the CRSP value-weighted market return over the same window (−20,−1) (CRET (−20,−1)) are
likely to disproportionately affect humans compared to machines. For example, humans are more
likely to be affected by sentiment and more likely to be constrained in their ability to process rele-
vant information during periods of intense information arrival. While these instrumental variables
are likely to affect market efficiency, their effects are through the ability for market participants
(machines and humans) to access and assimilate relevant company-specific information. Therefore,
our first-stage regression is:




ϕjΓi,j,t + f̃ + τ̃ + εi,t (5)
where VM,Hi,t is machine or human viewership of firm i’s 8-K on days t ∈ {0, 1}, measured by the
Ryans (2017) method. We estimate the first-stage equation for machines or humans separately.
InvSent, MacroNews, V IX(−20,−1), and CRET (−20,−1) are our instruments. Γi,j,t is a vector
of controls j including BM , SIZE, ROA, LEV , STDRET , InstOwn and Analysts. f̃ and τ̃ are
firm and year fixed effects.
Table (6) reports the results. Columns (1) and (2) show that our instruments significantly affect
human, but not on machine, viewership of 8-K filings as hypothesized. Human viewership is neg-
atively related to investor sentiment, suggesting that humans are less likely to access information
related to unscheduled events when investor sentiment is high. Human viewership is also negatively
related to the release of macroeconomic news at the time of the 8-K publication date. This result
is consistent with humans having attention and cognitive constraints that make them less atten-
tive to firm-specific information when there is substantial market-wide information, e.g., (Peng and
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Xiong, 2006; Kacperczyk et al., 2016). Lastly, human viewership is also negatively impacted by the
V IX(−20,−1) and the market return CRET (−20,−1), consistent with humans having a tendency
to read more 8-Ks in rising markets and during lower volatility. The Stock-Yogo test of the null
hypothesis: β̂3 = β̂4 = β̂5 = β̂6 = 0 is rejected as F -statistic is in excess of 10 for human viewer-
ship, but as expected, we cannot reject the same null hypothesis for machine viewership. Overall,
the first-stage regressions confirm that the four instruments disproportionately affect human 8-K
viewership.
The second-stage regressions are:








ϕjΓi,j,t + f̃ + τ̃ + εi,t (6)
where DRIFT (2, T )i,t is our baseline measure of inefficiency, defined earlier in Equation (2), V̂
M,H
i,t
are the fitted values of machine and human viewership, Γi,j,t is the same vector of control variables,
and f̃ and τ̃ are firm and year fixed effects.
The second-stage results are also in Table (6), columns (3-8). They are consistent with our
baseline results discussed earlier. Namely, human viewership is significantly positively related to
price drift whereas machine viewership, pooling across all the machine types, is not detrimental to
market efficiency. Hence the instrumental variables models reinforce the estimates reported in Table
(4) and discussed in Section (4.2).
5.2. Evidence from exogenous disruptions
Our second approach is based on exogenous cloud service and major power outages that dispro-
portionately disrupt machines. We use major power outage events in the US as the disruption to
machine-based viewership. To focus on the events that are likely to affect many investors using
automated models, we consider a day as having an outage (an Outage Day) if it hits one of major
cloud service providers, such as Amazon Web Services, or impacted at least 500,000 customers and
lasted for at least 10 hours. Such outages, by interrupting the connectivity of computing facilities
running automated investment models, are expected to reduce the ability for machines to improve
price discovery.
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We regress DRIFT (2, T )i,t on machine and human viewership and a dummy variable that is
one on outage days and zero otherwise. We include interactions between cloud computing, ma-
chine and human viewership and the outage days dummy, and control for our standard list of stock
characteristics: BM , SIZE, ROA, LEV , STDRET , InstOwn, and Analysts.
Table (7) reports the results. As expected, we find that the coefficients of the interaction between
CouldMachine or Machine viewership and Cloud Outage Day, β̂2 and β̂4, are positive and significant
in columns (1) and (2). These estimates suggest that during unexpected cloud outage days the
viewership through some clouds is less effective in reducing the price drift post to 8-K publication
day, and hence there is a corresponding deterioration in market efficiency. The relationship remains
consistent up to 20 trading days after the 8-K publication day (columns 4 and 5), though it becomes
statistically weaker. In contrast, we find no significant effects for the interaction term between human
viewership and major cloud outages (insignificant β̂6 coefficients in columns (3) and (6)).
Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction between Machine viewership and Power Outage Day
(β̂4) is also positive and significant in column (8), though the coefficient of interaction between cloud
viewership and power outage is statistically insignificant. Besides, the significant relationship is
only present up to 10 trading days after the 8-K publication day. Lastly, no significant effects are
found for the interaction term between human viewership and major power outages (insignificant β̂6
coefficients in columns (9) and (12)). These results suggest that the power outages are more likely
to interrupt the functionality of computing facilities that are not as geographically diversified or not
as technologically advanced as major cloud service providers.
5.3. S&P500 inclusion as a quasi-natural experiment
Our third approach uses a firm i’s inclusion in the S&P500 index as a quasi-natural experiment
(Shleifer, 1986; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Bennett et al., 2020). A stock is added to the
S&P500 index only when another stock is excluded, mainly due to major corporate actions such
as mergers, bankruptcy, and spin-offs. The sudden surge in institutional investors’ attention for
the newly added stock creates an exogenous shock in viewership, disproportionately from human
analysts and fund managers due to their limited capacity to follow stocks outside of their mandate
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(Farboodi et al., 2020).23 Human attention is a scarce cognitive resource (Barber and Odean, 2008;
Kahneman, 1973) and influences the market’s reaction to corporate announcements (e.g., Hirshleifer
et al. (2009); Kempf et al. (2017)). The existing literature also shows that a stock’s inclusion in the
S&P500 index attracts more sophisticated and skilled investors (Chen et al., 2004). This increase in
sophistication and skill is another reason why inclusion in the S&P500 index is expected to improve
the impact of humans on informational efficiency.
In contrast, machines are less likely to be constrained in their capacity to process information
and therefore, as we showed earlier, show less of a tendency to favor particular types of stocks in
their information acquisition activities. We therefore expect inclusion in the S&P500 index to have
little or no effect on how machines impact informational efficiency.
We use difference-in-differences regressions to examine the joint effects of 8-K viewership by
humans or machines and the firm’s inclusion in the S&P500 index on the price drift following 8-K
filings. The dependent variable is the DRIFT (2, T )i,t measure. As the key independent variables, we
have interactions of machine or human viewership of firm i’s 8-K with a dummy variable for S&P500
index inclusion (InIndext). This allows us to also include the InIndext variable by itself to capture
any index effects that are not associated specifically with human or machine viewership of 8-Ks. We
also include the human and machine viewership variables by themselves to capture their effects that
are not related to index inclusion, firm and year fixed effects, and a range of control variables. We
also limit the sample in these tests to stocks that are included in the S&P500 index at some stage
during our sample period to reduce the effect of other firm characteristics associated with the price
drift.
Table (8) reports the results of the difference-in-difference tests. The primary coefficients of in-
terest are for the interaction term between human viewership and index inclusion, V Hi,t × InIndext.
These coefficients are negative in all specifications (columns 2, 4 and 6) and statistically significant
at the 5% or 10% levels. Consistent with our hypothesis, the results suggest that index inclusion
improves the impact of humans viewership on informational efficiency. That is, all else equal, hu-
23Begenau et al. (2018) examine whether big data disproportionately benefits large firms by splitting firms by S&P500
index membership. Similarly, Farboodi et al. (2020) examine whether firms in the S&P500 index have different stock
price informativeness.
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man viewership in S&P500 stocks is more likely to improve efficiency and reduce drift than human
viewership in non-S&P500 stocks.
In contrast, the coefficient of VMi,t × InIndext, is insignificant, suggesting that S&P500 inclusion
does not significantly affect the impact of machines on price drift. This result is also consistent with
our hypothesis that, unlike human viewership, automated models are less resource-limited and are
not concentrated in index stocks.
Overall, the results from the instrumental variables tests, the exogenous outages, and the quasi-
experimental tests of index inclusion events support a causal interpretation of our baseline results
about how humans and machines impact price drift following 8-K filings. In an unreported table,
we repeat our tests with the machine and human viewership measured by DRT (Drake et al., 2015),
and find qualitatively similar results.
6. The Mechanisms
In this section, we explore a few key mechanisms through which machines and humans impact
informational efficiency. First, if automated models are built on predefined rules or extrapolated
by machine learning, they should be capable of handling complicated textual records better than
humans. Second, machines should also be less susceptible to emotions and therefore should be better
able to handle information in the presence of negative sentiment content that is known to elicit
bias in human decisions. Third, we explore how well machines and humans process and combine
incremental signals for the same events, drawing on the theoretical predictions of Dugast and Foucault
(2018) about the trade-off between fast and noisy versus slow and accurate information processing.
Finally we examine whether the positive effects of cloud-based machines is associated with more
accurate processing of information in 8-Ks, faster processing of the information, or both, by examining
measures of informed trading and algorithmic trading.
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6.1. Readability
We first test how well humans and machines impound hard-to-read information by examining lin-
guistically complex 8-Ks. We use two proxies of readability to test the effectiveness in processing and
assimilating such information: the Gunning FOG, and the Flesch-Kincaid. We label them as Diffi-
cultToRead. We regress DRIFT (2, T )i,t on machine and human viewership activities of 8-K filings,
the two measures of 8-K DifficultToRead, and importantly interactions between machine and human
viewership and DifficultToRead. We control for BM , SIZE, ROA, LEV , STDRET , InstOwn, and
Analysts.
The results are reported in Table (9) using Gunning FOG in columns (1-4) and Flesch-Kincaid
in columns (5-8). Consistent with our conjecture, we find that machine 8-K viewership (in columns
1 and 5) lessens the price drift following 8-K filings by a larger amount for harder-to-read 8-Ks,
which is information that will be more challenging for human readers to interpret. Another possible
interpretation of this finding is consistent with recent evidence suggesting that the increasing machine
downloading activity motivates firms to prepare filings according to machines’ readership, processing
capacity and capability (Cao et al., 2020). In contrast, the interactions between human viewership
of 8-Ks and DifficultToRead measures are not statistically different from zero (columns (3-4) and
(7-8)).
6.2. Negative sentiment
We examine whether machine viewers, in particular those associated with automated investment
decisions, are better able to handle negative sentiment content in 8-Ks. We regress DRIFT (2, T )i,t
on (a) machine viewership from cloud computing services, (b) machine viewership from financial
institutions, and (c) negative sentiment in a 8-K defined by Loughran and Mcdonald (2011), as well
as interactions between cloud machine and institutional investor machine with negative sentiment.
We include a wide range of controls such as BM , SIZE, ROA, LEV , STDRET , InstOwn, and
Analysts.
Table (10) reports the results. The results support the notion that machines are better at
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handling negative sentiment without bias and therefore have a larger positive effect on informational
efficiency (larger negative effect on drift) when information is more likely to induce bias in humans
due to negative sentiment. Specifically, columns (1), (3), and (5) show that machine viewership from
cloud computing services reduces the price drift more among the 8-K with considerable negative
sentiment content. The interaction term coefficients are negative and significant up to two months
following the 8-K publication date. Along similar lines, results in columns (2), (4), and (6) show that
machine viewership from financial institutions also reduces the price drift following 8-Ks with higher
negative sentiment content, even though the machine viewership from institutional investors does not
affect price drift overall. When we replace machine viewership from cloud computing services with
aggregated machine viewership, the interaction variables are no longer significant, suggesting machine
viewership from cloud computers and financial institutions play an important role in correcting the
emotional biases of humans.
6.3. Incremental information and earnings announcement drift
Guided by the theoretical predictions of Dugast and Foucault (2018), we examine whether machines
or humans are better at combining sequential signals to produce more precise information. The
theory shows there is a trade-off between fast and noisy responses to early signals and slower but
more accurate responses that potentially combine more signals. We expect that the incremental
signals are less likely to affect the information processing preciseness of automated models, which
are heavily relying on the information provided in an 8-K filing, than human viewers, including
experienced analysts who focus on a small number of firms. To examine this difference, we use item
2.02 of the 8-Ks, which largely reveals the same earnings information that has already been disclosed
in the press release in an abbreviated format. We regress DRIFT (2, T )i,t on machine and human
viewership activities, a dummy variable that is one for 8-K filings that include item2.02, and zero
otherwise, as well as interactions between machine and human viewership and the item2.02 dummy.
We include standard controls: BM , SIZE, ROA, LEV , STDRET , InstOwn, and Analysts. All
variables are defined in the Appendix Table A.
The results reported in Table (11) indicate no evidence that incremental information in item2.02
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affects the impact of machine viewership on price drift. In contrast, the interaction term between
human viewership and item2.02 has a negative and significant effect on the price drift up to 10 or
20 days following the 8-K publication date. Therefore, based on the theoretical prediction of Dugast
and Foucault (2018), our analysis shows that automated models are limited in their ability to use
incremental signals to produce more precise information, whereas humans are better able to use
incremental signals regarding earning announcements more efficiently.
6.4. Viewership and informed trading
Is the positive effect of cloud computing machines on informational efficiency the result of machines
being better at interpreting the information (more informed), faster at interpreting the information,
or both? To shed some light on this issue, we first test the relation between human and machine view-
ership and measures of informed trading (this subsection) and then the relation between viewership
type and algorithm trading (next subsection).
The microstructure-based Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) is widely used as a measure of
the time-varying information asymmetry in financial markets. It captures the information advantage
held by better informed investors (Bharath et al., 2009) based on the properties of the order flow.
We use the PIN to test how the level of informed trading varies depending on the levels of human
and machine viewership of 8-Ks. We regress PIN(0, T ), which is the average daily Probability of
Informed Trading of firm i over the window (0, T ) on machine and human viewership, controlling for
BM , SIZE, ROA, LEV , STDRET , InstOwn, and Analysts.
Table (12) presents our findings from this analysis. Machine viewership on days t ∈ {0, 1} is
positively related to PIN(0, 1) and PIN(0, 5) (columns 1 and 5). In contrast, we find a significantly
negative relation between human viewership and PIN(0, 1) and PIN(0, 5) (columns 2 and 6). We
further explore the results by machine category. We find that machine viewership from cloud com-
puting services is predominant positive driver of the position relation with PIN(0, 1) and PIN(0, 5)
(columns 3 and 7).
In summary, the results indicate that the machine (human) viewership is significantly positively
(negatively) related to the probability of informed trading. These results support the earlier evidence
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that cloud computing machines in particular contribute to price discovery and improve informational
efficiency, while humans tend to be less well informed traders.
6.5. Viewership and algorithmic trading
Automated investment decisions implemented through algorithmic trading are likely to be faster in
responding to new information than manual trading decisions and in particular manual handling
of order execution. This speed advantage of machines relative to humans is possibly one of the
contributors to the positive effect of cloud computing machines on informational efficiency. To
examine this notion, we test the relation between algorithmic trading, proxied by (a) the Odd Lot
Ratio, and (b) the Trade Size, and contemporary machine and human 8-K viewership.24 Algorithmic
trading usually splits large trades into smaller order to spread out trade over time, blend in with
other order flow, and avoid a large price change. For this reason, a smaller trade size and larger
proportion of odd lots is often considered to reflect algorithmic trading. An automated model that
improves market efficiency would involve both textual data analysis and algorithmic trading.
We regress either the Odd Lot Ratio or the Trade Size (as dependent variables in separate es-
timations) on machine and human viewership. We control for BM , SIZE, ROA, LEV , STDRET ,
InstOwn, and Analysts. Table (13) presents our findings from this analysis. There is interesting
heterogeneity in the impact of human and machine viewership of 8-Ks on days t ∈ {0, 1} on the
distribution of OddLotRatiot(0, 1). As expected we find that human 8-K viewership is negatively
related to the amount of algorithmic trading proxied by the OddLotRatio(0, 1) (column (2)). In con-
trast, we find that the machine 8-K viewership from cloud computing services is positively related to
the OddLotRatio(0, 1) as indicated in column (3). Hence machine viewership from cloud computing
services leads to more algorithmic trading.
We also examine how human and machine viewership of 8-Ks affects TradeSize(0, 1) in columns
(5-8). We find that human 8-K viewers are positively related to the trade size (column 6). In contrast,
24As algorithmic trading based on newly arrived 8-K filings is likely to involve fast trading as investors race to trade
on the basis of the information, we expect to see predominantly informed market orders. These should be reflected in
the Odd Lot Ratio and the Trade Size suggested by Weller (2017), but not necessarily in other proxies of algorithmic
trading that are more targeted at measuring algorithmic market making, such as the Order-to-Trade Ratio or the
Cancel-to-Trade Ratio.
29
machine 8-K viewership from cloud computing services is negatively related to the trade size (column
7). Therefore, cloud machine (human) viewership is significantly and positively (negatively) related
to algorithmic trading around the publication date of the 8-K.
7. Conclusion
Advances in computing and machine learning are rapidly changing how investors acquire and use
firm-specific information. We find that machine viewership of company 8-K filings has increased
exponentially during recent years and now represents a significant fraction of total visits of 8-Ks in
the SEC’s EDGAR server.
Using novel data, we show that these changes in how information is accessed and used affect
how the information is impounded into stock prices. Information acquired by machines from cloud
computing servers significantly improves informational efficiency and decreases price drift following
information releases. In contrast, humans accessing the same information do not benefit informa-
tional efficiency as much and can even harm efficiency. We overcome identification problems by
examining the causal effect of machine and human viewership on the price drift using instrumental
variables, exogenous cloud service and major power outages, and a quasi-natural experiment.
We find that machine viewership improves informational efficiency the most when the information
contained in the 8-K filing is more linguistically complex and therefore harder for a human to read.
Machine viewers from cloud computing services and also financial institution are less susceptible
to bias from negative sentiment than humans and therefore significantly improve efficiency in how
markets digest news that has a negative content or tone. We also find that sequential/incremental
signals may be more difficult for automated models to combine than they are for a human and this is
one aspect of information processing where humans may currently still have an advantage. Our anal-
ysis further shows that the machine (human) viewership is significantly and positively (negatively)
related to the daily probability of informed trading. Finally, we find that information viewership by
cloud computing machines is significantly associated with the level of algorithm trading activity.
Overall, our findings uncover the important role of machine-based quantitative investment or
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trading strategies in assimilating and incorporating information in the underlying firm’s stock prices.
Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of machines in financial markets and their
impact on informational efficiency.
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Figure 1: 8-K viewership activity by machines and humans
This figure presents total, machine, and human viewership activities of firm i’s 8-K files on days t ∈ {0, 1}
(relative to the 8-K publication date). Total visits is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of views
by both machines and humans. Machine visits and Human visits denote machine and human viewership
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Figure 2: 8-K viewership activity by organization.
This figure presents machine viewership activity of firm i’s 8-K filings by Cloud Computing, Institutional
Investor, and Internet Provider on days t ∈ {0, 1} (relative to the 8-K publication date), measured by
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables used in our analysis. Machine and
Human (Panel A) denote our main variables of machine and human viewership activities of firm
i’s 8-K filings on days t ∈ {0, 1}, relative to 8-K publication date, which are measured based on
methods proposed by Ryans (2017). Alternatively, our machine and human viewership activities
of 8-K filings are measured by methods proposed by Drake et al. (2015), which are denoted by
MachineDRT and HumanDRT , respectively. Our main (control) variables, which are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles, include: BM refers to the ratio of book value over the market
value of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; SIZE is the natural logarithm of
market value of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; ROA is the return on as-
sets; LEV is the total debt over total assets; STDRET is the standard deviation of monthly return
over the year prior to an 8-K filing; InstOwn is the institutional ownership percentage calculated
in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing; and Analysts is the number of analyst covering the firm in
the quarter prior to its 8-K filing disclosure. DRIFT (2, 10), DRIFT (2, 20), and DRIFT (2, 40)
are measured by the absolute difference between post-announcement price variation and variation
over a short window right after the 8-K announcement, as described in Equation (2). Item#.#
(Panel B) refers to a dummy variable equal to one if an 8-K filing containing a 8-K item#.#,
zero otherwise. Accordingly, the Item1.01 refers to Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement,
the Item2.02 refers to Results of Operations and Financial Condition, the Item5.02 refers to De-
parture of Directors or Certain Officers Election of Directors Appointment, the Item7.01 refers to
Regulation FD Disclosure, and the Item8.01 refers to Other Events. Lastly, visiting organizations
(Panel C) refer to the number of 8-K visits by organizational types on days t ∈ {0, 1} relative to
8-K publication date. All variables are defined in the Appendix Table A.
N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Machine 551,136 3.29 1.42 2.08 3.61 4.41
MachineDRT 551,136 3.34 1.41 2.08 3.66 4.45
Human 551,136 1.34 1.07 0.69 1.39 2.08
HumanDRT 551,136 1.05 0.96 0.00 1.10 1.61
BM 551,136 0.75 0.99 0.29 0.55 0.89
SIZE 551,136 6.44 2.05 4.99 6.40 7.80
ROA 551,136 -0.03 0.20 -0.02 0.02 0.06
LEV 551,136 0.23 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.37
STDRET 551,136 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.15
InstOwn 551,136 0.61 0.32 0.34 0.66 0.87
Analysts 551,136 1.63 0.98 0.69 1.79 2.40
DRIFT (2, 10) 551,054 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.07
DRIFT (2, 20) 551,054 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.11
DRIFT (2, 40) 551,054 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.17
Panel B: 8-K Items
#Filings #Visits per Filing
Item 1.01 62,396 77.58 143.79 9 40 101
Item 2.02 193,330 69.91 138.98 9 41 90
Item 5.02 70,920 74.17 121.78 12 47 97
Item 7.01 117,747 78.84 184.95 9 45 102
Item 8.01 144,925 71.28 159.56 8 39 91
Other Items 89,218 82.72 147.72 15 52 108
Panel C: Visiting Organizations(1000)
#Org. #Visits per Organization (Org.)
Auditing & Law Firms 130 3.49 19.49 0.03 0.45 2.29
Data Cloud Services 938 13.78 204.00 0.00 0.01 0.07
Data Vendor & Media 381 4.92 39.22 0.00 0.01 0.08
Education and Regulator 3,172 0.10 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.01
Institutional Investor 992 3.98 34.14 0.01 0.04 0.32
Internet Service Provider 1,153 10.14 77.68 0.01 0.03 0.48
Others 18,930 0.07 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.02
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Table 2: Determinants of machines and human viewership of 8-Ks
This table reports OLS regression estimates from our analysis on the determinants of 8-K viewership
activity on days t ∈ {0, 1}, relative to 8-K publication date. TotalV isits is the natural logarithm of
one plus the number of 8-K views by both machines and humans. Machine and Human denote our
main variables of machine and human viewership activities of firm i’s 8-K filings on days t ∈ {0, 1},
relative to 8-K publication date, which are measured based on methods proposed by Ryans (2017).
Alternatively, our machine and human viewership activities of 8-K filings are measured by methods
proposed by Drake et al. (2015), which are denoted by MachineDRT and HumanDRT , respectively.
FinNeg is the proportion of negative words defined by Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) in an 8-K
filing, FOG is the Gunning fog index, a readability measure, is computed based on the words used in
an 8-K filing, WordCount is the number of words used in an 8-K filing, DayRelease is the number
of days between 8-K event date to the 8-K publication date, #Item is the number of topics included
in an 8-K filing, BM is the ratio of book value over the market value of common equity in the year
end prior to an 8-K filing, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of common equity in the
year end prior to an 8-K filing, InstOwn is the institutional ownership percentage calculated in the
quarter prior to an 8-K filing, and Analysts is the number of analyst covering a firm in the quarter
prior to an 8-K filing, which are control variables across all columns. All variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are also defined in the Appendix Table A. Firm FE
and Year FE denote firm and year fixed effects. Nobs refers to the number of observations. Adj.R2
is the adjusted R2 value. All t−statistics reported in parentheses are computed based on adjusted
standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
TotalV isits Machine Human MachineDRT HumanDRT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FinNeg 0.984* -0.028 4.756*** 0.169 5.500***
(1.76) (-0.05) (9.02) (0.30) (10.11)
FOG 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.31) (0.49) (-1.21) (0.41) (-1.07)
WordCount 0.050*** 0.051** 0.060*** 0.051*** 0.047***
(3.21) (2.99) (5.85) (3.18) (5.06)
DayRelease -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.055*** -0.017*** -0.042***
(-7.09) (-5.00) (-7.87) (-5.72) (-8.06)
#Item 0.098*** 0.081*** 0.150*** 0.092*** 0.100***
(11.58) (8.41) (16.56) (9.72) (12.59)
BM 0.009** 0.001 0.037*** 0.003 0.037***
(2.28) (0.22) (5.99) (0.86) (6.52)
SIZE 0.012 0.007 0.033*** 0.008 0.032***
(1.37) (0.89) (3.08) (0.93) (3.21)
InstOwn 0.004 -0.007 -0.148*** -0.001 -0.167***
(0.09) (-0.17) (-3.12) (-0.02) (-3.61)
Analysts 0.000 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.009
(0.04) (-0.19) (0.72) (-0.16) (0.82)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 556,283 556,283 556,283 556,283 556,283
Adj. R2 0.845 0.348 0.404 0.862 0.872
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Table 3: Machine and human viewership of different 8-K items
This table reports OLS regression estimates from our analysis on the determinants of viewership activities of
8-K filings on days t ∈ {0, 1} (relative to the 8-K publication date) by Machine and Human. Machine and
Human denote machine and human viewership activities of firm i’s 8-K filings on days t ∈ {0, 1} (relative to
the 8-K publication date), measured by methods proposed by Ryans (2017). Item#.# refers to a dummy vari-
able equal to one if an 8-K filing containing a 8-K item#.#, zero otherwise. Accordingly, the Item1.01 refers
to Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement, the Item2.02 refers to Results of Operations and Financial Con-
dition, the Item5.02 refers to Departure of Directors or Certain Officers Election of Directors Appointment, the
Item7.01 refers to Regulation FD Disclosure, and the Item8.01 refers to Other Events. Control variables in-
clude: FinNeg that refers to the proportion of negative words defined by Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) in an
8-K filing; FOG that refers to the Gunning fog index, a readability measure, is computed based on the words
used in an 8-K filing; WordCount that refers to the number of words used in an 8-K filing; DayRelease that
refers to the number of days between 8-K event date to the 8-K publication date; BM that refers to the ratio of
book value over the market value of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; SIZE that refers to
the natural logarithm of market value of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; InstOwn that
refers to the institutional ownership percentage calculated in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing; and Analysts
that refers to the number of analyst covering a firm in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing. All variables are win-
sorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are also defined in the Appendix Table A. Firm FE and
Year FE denote firm and year fixed effects. Nobs refers to the number of observations. Adj.R2 is the adjusted
R2 value. t−statistics are reported in parentheses and computed based on adjusted standard errors clustered at
the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Machine Human











Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 533,160 533,160 533,160 533,160 533,160 533,160 533,160 533,160 533,160 533,160
Adj. R2 0.863 0.863 0.864 0.863 0.864 0.393 0.383 0.385 0.387 0.386
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Table 4: Impact of machine and human viewership on price drift
This table reports OLS regression estimates from our analysis of the impact of Machine and Human viewer-
ship activities of firm i’s 8-K filings on days t ∈ {0, 1} (relative to the 8-K publication date) on DRIFT (2, 10),
DRIFT (2, 20), and DRIFT (2, 40). DRIFT (2, 10), DRIFT (2, 20) and DRIFT (2, 40) are measured by the ab-
solute difference between post-announcement price variation and variation over a short window right after the
announcement, as described in Equation (2). Machine and Human denote machine and human viewership ac-
tivities, measured by methods proposed by Ryans (2017). BM is the ratio of book value over the market value
of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of com-
mon equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing, ROA is the return on assets, LEV is the total debt over total
assets, STDRET is the standard deviation of monthly return over the year prior to an 8-K filing, InstOwn is
the institutional ownership percentage calculated in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing, and Analysts is the num-
ber of analyst covering a firm in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing, are control variables across all columns. All
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are also defined in the Appendix Table A.
Firm FE and Year FE denote firm and year fixed effects. Nobs refers to the number of observations. Adj.R2 is
the adjusted R2 value. t−statistics are reported in parentheses and computed based on adjusted standard errors
clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DRIFT (2, 10) DRIFT (2, 20) DRIFT (2, 40)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Machine 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.003
(0.93) (0.22) (1.00) (0.45) (1.21) (0.61)
Human 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(4.12) (6.20) (3.86) (7.00) (4.40) (6.22)
BM 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(6.40) (6.37) (6.35) (5.76) (5.66) (5.71) (5.51) (5.41) (5.44)
SIZE -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(-9.43) (-9.63) (-9.55) (-13.22) (-13.62) (-13.46) (-13.22) (-13.59) (-13.49)
ROA -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061***
(-7.02) (-7.09) (-7.05) (-9.04) (-9.20) (-9.11) (-9.56) (-9.63) (-9.59)
LEV 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(4.01) (3.88) (3.94) (5.63) (5.54) (5.58) (5.59) (5.49) (5.55)
STDRET 0.027*** 0.026** 0.027** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.077***
(3.02) (2.94) (2.95) (4.11) (4.03) (4.06) (4.99) (4.90) (4.93)
InstOwn -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(-4.13) (-4.03) (-4.07) (-4.98) (-4.85) (-4.93) (-3.49) (-3.39) (-3.45)
Analysts 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (-0.58) (-0.61) (-0.60) (-1.22) (-1.26) (-1.25)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 550,928 550,928 550,928 550,928 550,928 550,928 550,928 550,928 550,928


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Instrumental variables tests
The table presents estimates from our two-stage least squares analysis using four market sentiment metrics
as instrumental variables. Machine and Human denote machine and human viewership activities of 8-K
filings on days t ∈ {0, 1}. DRIFT (2, 10), DRIFT (2, 20) and DRIFT (2, 40) are measured by the absolute
difference between post-announcement price variation and variation over a short window right after the an-
nouncement, as described in Equation (2). Our instruments are: InvSent, MacroNews, V IX(−20,−1),
and CRET (−20,−1). BM is the ratio of book value over the market value of common equity in the year
end prior to an 8-K filing, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of common equity in the year
end prior to an 8-K filing, ROA is the return on assets, LEV is the total debt over total assets, STDRET is
the standard deviation of monthly return over the year prior to an 8-K filing, InstOwn is the institutional
ownership percentage calculated in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing, and Analysts is the number of analyst
covering a firm in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing, are control variables across all columns. All variables
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are also defined in the Appendix Table A. Firm
FE and Year FE denote firm and year fixed effects. Nobs refers to the number of observations. Weak ID
F−stat is for the Stock-Yogo test and t−statistics are reported in parentheses and computed based on ad-
justed standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
First Stage Second Stage
Machine Human DRIFT (2, 10) DRIFT (2, 20) DRIFT (2, 40)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Machine 0.113 0.152 0.202
(1.71) (1.75) (1.60)






V IX(−20,−1) 0.007 -0.103*
(0.12) (-1.72)
CRET (−20,−1) -0.573 -0.720***
(-1.24) (-2.65)
BM -0.001 0.045*** 0.004*** -0.001 0.005*** -0.001 0.007*** -0.000
(-0.15) (6.86) (5.23) (-0.35) (5.14) (-0.25) (5.06) (-0.10)
SIZE 0.004 0.054*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.028***
(0.49) (4.55) (-9.15) (-5.98) (-9.09) (-5.86) (-10.24) (-7.47)
ROA 0.009 -0.138*** -0.030*** -0.016** -0.042*** -0.023*** -0.063*** -0.039***
(0.47) (-3.25) (-7.25) (-2.93) (-8.77) (-3.07) (-9.43) (-3.97)
LEV 0.009 0.311*** 0.018*** -0.011 0.028*** -0.009 0.045*** -0.004
(0.33) (6.16) (4.16) (-0.95) (5.17) (-0.63) (5.28) (-0.26)
STDRET 0.007 0.286*** 0.030*** 0.004 0.046*** 0.012 0.077*** 0.032
(0.22) (5.28) (4.03) (0.26) (4.04) (0.60) (4.90) (1.25)
InstOwn 0.007 -0.118*** -0.012** -0.000 -0.018** -0.002 -0.022** -0.002
(0.18) (-2.67) (-2.72) (-0.06) (-2.80) (-0.30) (-2.24) (-0.22)
Analysts 0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.17) (0.51) (0.34) (-0.03) (-0.16) (-0.71) (-0.56) (-1.15)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 550,411 550,411 550,411 550,411 550,411 550,411 550,411 550,411









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: The effects of S&P500 inclusion on machines and humans
This table reports regression estimates from difference-in-difference models that examine the joint ef-
fects of 8-K viewership and S&P500 inclusion on post-event price drift. DRIFT (2, 10), DRIFT (2, 20)
and DRIFT (2, 40) are measured by the absolute difference between post-announcement price varia-
tion and variation over a short window right after the announcement, as described in Equation (2).
Machine and Human denote machine and human viewership activities of firm i’s 8-K filings on days
t ∈ {0, 1}. InIndex is a binary variable that is assigned the value of one if a stock is added into the
S&P500 index, and zero otherwise. BM is the ratio of book value over the market value of common
equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of com-
mon equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing, ROA is the return on assets, LEV is the total debt
over total assets, STDRET is the standard deviation of monthly return over the year prior to an 8-K
filing, InstOwn is the institutional ownership percentage calculated in the quarter prior to an 8-K
filing, and Analysts is the number of analyst covering a firm in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing, are
control variables across all columns. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All
variables are also defined in the Appendix Table A. Firm FE and Year FE denote firm and year fixed
effects. Nobs refers to the number of observations. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 value. t−statistics are
reported in parentheses and computed based on adjusted standard errors clustered at the firm-year
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DRIFT (2, 10) DRIFT (2, 20) DRIFT (2, 40)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Machine 0.002 0.004 0.005
(1.27) (1.50) (1.04)
Machine× InIndex -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.56) (-1.33) (-0.35)
Human 0.003** 0.004** 0.005*
(2.70) (2.17) (2.14)
Human× InIndex -0.002** -0.002** -0.003*
(-2.35) (-2.24) (-1.99)
InIndex 0.003 0.004* 0.008* 0.007** 0.010 0.013*
(1.43) (1.87) (2.10) (2.43) (1.34) (2.11)
BM 0.002* 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.010** 0.010**
(1.78) (1.71) (1.31) (1.27) (2.94) (2.98)
SIZE -0.004** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.005 -0.005
(-2.58) (-2.78) (-3.28) (-3.30) (-1.18) (-1.30)
ROA -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.053*** -0.052***
(-4.03) (-4.10) (-4.27) (-4.24) (-5.24) (-5.15)
LEV 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.011
(0.77) (0.73) (1.38) (1.34) (1.44) (1.43)
STDRET 0.047** 0.045** 0.065** 0.062** 0.108 0.105
(2.27) (2.19) (2.32) (2.22) (1.75) (1.69)
InstOwn -0.012** -0.012** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.015* -0.014
(-2.76) (-2.67) (-3.93) (-3.85) (-1.83) (-1.72)
Analysts 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.006
(0.22) (0.21) (0.03) (0.05) (-1.73) (-1.74)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 35,020 35,020 35,020 35,020 35,020 35,020
Adj. R2 0.157 0.158 0.168 0.168 0.192 0.193
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Table 9: Readability and price drift
The table presents estimates from our analysis of the impact of readability (DifficultToRead) proxies on
the price drift post to 8-K filings date as a test to our information-assimilation channel. Gunning FOG and
Flesch-Kincaid are readability measures computed based on the textual contents of a 8-K to proximate how
hard the filing is to read. DRIFT (2, 10) and DRIFT (2, 20) are measured by the absolute difference between
post-announcement price variation and variation over a short window right after the announcement, as de-
scribed in Equation (2). Machine and Human denote machine and human viewership activities of 8-K filings
on days t ∈ {0, 1}. Control variables across all columns include: BM that refers to the ratio of book value
over the market value of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; SIZE that refers to the nat-
ural logarithm of market value of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; ROA that refers to
the return on assets; LEV that refers to the total debt over total assets; STDRET that refers to the standard
deviation of monthly return over the year prior to an 8-K filing; InstOwn that refers to the institutional own-
ership percentage calculated in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing; and Analysts that refers to the number of
analyst covering a firm in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. All variables are also defined in the Appendix Table A. Firm FE and Year FE denote firm and
year fixed effects. Nobs refers to the number of observations. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 value. t−statistics are
reported in parentheses and computed based on adjusted standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Gunning FOG Flesch-Kincaid
DRIFT (2, 10) DRIFT (2, 20) DRIFT (2, 10) DRIFT (2, 20)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Machine× -0.006** -0.003 -0.006** -0.004
DifficultToRead (-2.48) (-0.75) (-2.52) (-0.96)
Machine 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
(1.24) (1.10) (1.20) (1.12)
Human× -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
DifficultToRead (-1.37) (-1.29) (-1.47) (-1.51)
Human 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(3.95) (3.79) (4.05) (3.90)
DifficultToRead 0.009 -0.001 0.006 0.004 0.010* -0.001 0.007 0.004
(1.76) (-0.19) (0.69) (0.84) (1.91) (-0.32) (0.85) (0.89)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 517,848 517,848 517,848 517,848 517,848 517,848 517,848 517,848
Adj. R2 0.206 0.207 0.235 0.236 0.205 0.206 0.237 0.237
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Table 10: Negative sentiment and price drift
The table presents estimates from our analysis of the impact of negative sentiment on
the price drift post to 8-K filing date as a test to our information-assimilation chan-
nel. DRIFT (2, 10), DRIFT (2, 20) and DRIFT (2, 40) are measured by the absolute
difference between post-announcement price variation and variation over a short win-
dow right after the announcement, as described in Equation (2). CloudMachine is the
machine viewership by cloud computing services. InstMachine is the machine viewer-
ship by financial institutions. FinNeg is the proportion of negative words defined by
Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) in an 8-K filing. Control variables across all columns
include: BM that refers to the ratio of book value over the market value of common
equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; SIZE that refers to the natural loga-
rithm of market value of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; ROA
that refers to the return on assets; LEV that refers to the total debt over total assets;
STDRET that refers to the standard deviation of monthly return over the year prior
to an 8-K filing; InstOwn that refers to the institutional ownership percentage cal-
culated in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing; and Analysts that refers to the number
of analyst covering a firm in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing. All variables are win-
sorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are also defined in the Appendix
Table A. Firm FE and Year FE denote firm and year fixed effects. Nobs refers to the
number of observations. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 value. t−statistics are reported in
parentheses and computed based on adjusted standard errors clustered at the firm-year
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DRIFT (2, 10) DRIFT (2, 20) DRIFT (2, 40)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CloudMachine× -0.037** -0.056** -0.080*
FinNeg (-2.66) (-2.67) (-1.98)
CloudMachine -0.002*** -0.002* -0.002
(-3.27) (-1.95) (-1.18)
InstMachine× -0.062** -0.093* -0.136*
FinNeg (-2.19) (-2.13) (-1.99)
InstMachine 0.002 0.003 0.004
(1.43) (1.38) (1.44)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 517,828 517,828 517,828 517,828 517,828 517,828
Adj. R2 0.206 0.206 0.235 0.235 0.258 0.258
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Table 11: Incremental earnings information and price drift
The table presents estimates from our analysis of the impact of negative sentiment on
the price drift post to 8-K filing date as a test to our information-assimilation chan-
nel. DRIFT (2, 10) and DRIFT (2, 20) are measured by the absolute difference between
post-announcement price variation and variation over a short window right after the an-
nouncement, as described in Equation (2). Machine, Human, and CloudMachine de-
note machine and human viewership activities of 8-K filings on days t ∈ {0, 1}. Item2.02
is a dummy variable assigned the value of one if a 8-K contain Item2.02, zero otherwise.
Control variables across all columns include: BM that refers to the ratio of book value
over the market value of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; SIZE that
refers to the natural logarithm of market value of common equity in the year end prior to
an 8-K filing; ROA that refers to the return on assets; LEV that refers to the total debt
over total assets; STDRET that refers to the standard deviation of monthly return over
the year prior to an 8-K filing; InstOwn that refers to the institutional ownership per-
centage calculated in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing; and Analysts that refers to the
number of analyst covering a firm in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing. All variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are also defined in the Appendix
Table A. Firm FE and Year FE denote firm and year fixed effects. Nobs refers to the
number of observations. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 value. t−statistics are reported in
parentheses and computed based on adjusted standard errors clustered at the firm-year
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DRIFT (2, 10) DRIFT (2, 20)













Item2.02 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.005* -0.004** -0.004**
(-0.68) (-0.41) (-0.35) (-1.82) (-2.56) (-2.22)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 517,743 517,743 517,743 517,743 517,743 517,743
Adj. R2 0.206 0.207 0.206 0.236 0.236 0.235
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Table 12: Viewership and informed trading
The table presents estimates from our analysis of the impact of machine (and sub-categories including cloud
machine and financial institution machine) and human viewership activities on the average daily Probabil-
ity of Informed Trading on days (0, 1) and (0, 5), relative to the 8-K publication date, as a validation test.
Daily Average PIN(0, 1) and Daily Average PIN(0, 5) is the average of daily probability of information-
based trading (PIN) over windows (0, 1) and (0, 5), relative to the 8-K publication date. Machine and
Human denotes machine and human viewership activities of 8-K filings on days t ∈ {0, 1}. CloudMachine
is the machine viewership by cloud computing services, and InstMachine is the machine viewership by
financial institutions. Control variables across all columns include: BM that refers to the ratio of book
value over the market value of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; SIZE that refers to
the natural logarithm of market value of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; ROA that
refers to the return on assets; LEV that refers to the total debt over total assets; STDRET that refers to
the standard deviation of monthly return over the year prior to an 8-K filing; InstOwn that refers to the
institutional ownership percentage calculated in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing; and Analysts that refers
to the number of analyst covering a firm in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing. All variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are also defined in the Appendix Table A. Firm FE and Year
FE denote firm and year fixed effects. Nobs refers to the number of observations. Adj.R2 is the adjusted
R2 value. t−statistics are reported in parentheses and computed based on adjusted standard errors clus-
tered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Daily Average PIN(0, 1) Daily Average PIN(0, 5)









Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 500,817 500,817 471,747 471,747 500,817 500,817 471,747 471,747
Adj. R2 0.591 0.591 0.597 0.597 0.674 0.674 0.679 0.679
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Table 13: Viewership and algorithmic trading
The table presents estimates from our analysis of the impact of machine (and sub-categories including cloud
machine and financial institution machine) and human viewership activities on algorithmic trading (includ-
ing the OddLotRatio(0, 1) and the TradeSize(0, 1)) as a validation test. OddLotRatio(0, 1) is the fraction of
volume associated with abnormally small trades (less than 100 shares) over the day 0 and 1 relative to 8-K
publication date. TradeSize(0, 1) is the number of shares traded divided by the number of trades over the
day 0 and 1 relative to 8-K publication date. Machine and Human denote machine and human viewership
activities of 8-K filings on days t ∈ {0, 1}. CloudMachine is the machine viewership by cloud computing
services, and InstMachine is the machine viewership by financial institutions. Control variables across all
columns include: BM that refers to the ratio of book value over the market value of common equity in the
year end prior to an 8-K filing; SIZE that refers to the natural logarithm of market value of common equity
in the year end prior to an 8-K filing; ROA that refers to the return on assets; LEV that refers to the total
debt over total assets; STDRET that refers to the standard deviation of monthly return over the year prior to
an 8-K filing; InstOwn that refers to the institutional ownership percentage calculated in the quarter prior
to an 8-K filing; and Analysts that refers to the number of analyst covering a firm in the quarter prior to an
8-K filing. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are also defined in the
Appendix Table A. Firm FE and Year FE denote firm and year fixed effects. Nobs refers to the number of
observations. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 value. t−statistics are reported in parentheses and computed based
on adjusted standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
OddLotRatio(0, 1) TradeSize(0, 1)









Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 165,821 165,821 165,821 165,821 165,821 165,821 165,821 165,821

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table B: Top 8-K Viewers by Organisation Types
Organization Type Organization Name # Visits (Millions)
Cloud Computing AMAZON.COM 5.635
Cloud Computing 1&1 INTERNET AG 1.836
Cloud Computing VICTORY NETWORKS 1.476
Cloud Computing SOFTLAYER TECHNOLOGIES 1.098
Cloud Computing FUSIONSTORM 0.482
Cloud Computing CORESITE 0.320
Cloud Computing RACKSPACE LTD. 0.300
Cloud Computing DIGITAL OCEAN 0.274
Cloud Computing NET ACCESS CORPORATION 0.203
Cloud Computing SUNGARD AVAILABILITY NETWORK SOLUTIONS 0.181
Institutional Investor BARCLAYS CAPITAL 0.656
Institutional Investor TWO SIGMA INVESTMENTS, LLC 0.496
Institutional Investor THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP 0.403
Institutional Investor HUTCHIN HILL CAPITAL 0.285
Institutional Investor SCHONFELD TOOLS, LLC. 0.236
Institutional Investor HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 0.230
Institutional Investor HUTCHIN HILL CAPITAL, LP 0.222
Institutional Investor D. E. SHAW & CO. 0.180
Institutional Investor WILLIAM O’NEIL & COMPANY 0.164
Institutional Investor KNIGHT CAPITAL GROUP 0.098
Internet Provider CENTURYLINK 1.765
Internet Provider COMCAST 1.042
Internet Provider SPECTRUM 0.922
Internet Provider VERIZON 0.584
Internet Provider OPTIMUM ONLINE 0.523
Internet Provider AT&T SERVICES 0.518
Internet Provider OXFORD NETWORKS 0.411
Internet Provider ROGERS CABLE 0.357
Internet Provider ILIAD-ENTREPRISES 0.331
Internet Provider RESILANS AB 0.330
Rest/Other DOW JONES & COMPANY 0.588
Rest/Other MARKIT ON DEMAND 0.366
Rest/Other BLOOMBERG, LP 0.258
Rest/Other MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT AND TUNNEL 0.221
Rest/Other THOMSON REUTERS U.S. LLC 0.147
Rest/Other MCGRAW-HILL 0.127
Rest/Other CHENGXI MIDDLE SCHOOL 0.061
Rest/Other GOOGLEBOT* 0.060
Rest/Other REGUS GROUP SERVICES LTD 0.053
Rest/Other GODADDY.COM, LLC 0.049
* Googlebot is the generic name for Google’s web crawler.
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Appendix Table C: Alternative Measure of Machine Viewership
This table reports OLS regression estimates from our analysis of the alternative measures of
machine and cloud machine viewership activities of firm i’s 8-K filings on days t ∈ {0, 1}
(relative to the 8-K publication date) on DRIFT (2, 10), DRIFT (2, 20), and DRIFT (2, 40).
DRIFT (2, 10), DRIFT (2, 20) and DRIFT (2, 40) are measured by the absolute difference between
post-announcement price variation and variation over a short window right after the announce-
ment, as described in Equation (2). Machine/Total and CloudMachine/Total denote viewership
fraction from machine and cloud machine, and TotalV isit is the logarithm of total viewership.
BM is the ratio of book value over the market value of common equity in the year end prior to an
8-K filing, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of common equity in the year end prior
to an 8-K filing, ROA is the return on assets, LEV is the total debt over total assets, STDRET
is the standard deviation of monthly return over the year prior to an 8-K filing, InstOwn is the
institutional ownership percentage calculated in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing, and Analysts
is the number of analyst covering a firm in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing, are control variables
across all columns. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are
also defined in the Appendix Table A. Firm FE and Year FE denote firm and year fixed effects.
Nobs refers to the number of observations. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 value. t−statistics are re-
ported in parentheses and computed based on adjusted standard errors clustered at the firm-year
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DRIFT (2, 10) DRIFT (2, 20) DRIFT (2, 40)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Machine/Total -0.010** -0.011 -0.015
(-2.18) (-1.61) (-1.63)
CloudMachine/Total -0.017** -0.020* -0.023
(-2.36) (-1.98) (-1.50)
TotalV isit 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.008*
(1.14) (1.45) (1.23) (1.51) (1.52) (1.91)
BM 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(6.64) (6.68) (5.58) (5.54) (5.63) (5.67)
SIZE -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(-12.93) (-13.32) (-13.58) (-13.82) (-13.41) (-13.57)
ROA -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.061*** -0.062***
(-7.91) (-8.01) (-9.24) (-9.36) (-9.68) (-9.74)
LEV 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(4.19) (4.15) (5.53) (5.51) (5.51) (5.49)
STDRET 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.079*** 0.079***
(4.66) (4.70) (3.83) (3.85) (4.62) (4.66)
InstOwn -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.019** -0.019**
(-3.45) (-3.44) (-4.12) (-4.12) (-2.66) (-2.65)
Analysts -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003** -0.003**
(-0.35) (-0.33) (-1.19) (-1.17) (-2.21) (-2.19)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 517,848 517,848 517,848 517,848 517,848 517,848
Adj. R2 0.218 0.219 0.237 0.238 0.260 0.260
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Appendix Table D: Impact of viewership on price variance due to noise trading
This table reports OLS regression estimates from our analysis of the impact of Machine, Human and
CloudMachine viewership activities on Noise. Noise (the dependent variable) is the share of stock
return variance that is attributable to noise, which is developed by Brogaard et al. (2021). Machine,
Human and CloudMachine denote machine, human, and cloud machine viewership activities, respec-
tively, of firm i’s 8-K filings on days t ∈ {0, 1}. BM is the ratio of book value over the market value of
common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value
of common equity in the year end prior to an 8-K filing, ROA is the return on assets, LEV is the to-
tal debt over total assets, STDRET is the standard deviation of monthly return over the year prior to
an 8-K filing, InstOwn is the institutional ownership percentage calculated in the quarter prior to an
8-K filing, and Analysts is the number of analyst covering a firm in the quarter prior to an 8-K filing,
are control variables across all columns. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
All variables are also defined in the Appendix Table A. Firm FE and Year FE denote firm and year
fixed effects. Nobs refers to the number of observations. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared value.
t−statistics are reported in parentheses and computed based on adjusted standard errors clustered at









BM 0.127*** 0.123*** 0.127***
(8.08) (8.05) (8.12)
SIZE -0.243*** -0.247*** -0.242***
(-8.62) (-8.80) (-8.39)
ROA -0.642*** -0.628*** -0.640***
(-8.53) (-8.64) (-8.44)
LEV 0.576*** 0.547*** 0.575***
(4.90) (4.76) (4.85)
STDRET 0.771*** 0.746** 0.776***
(3.05) (2.96) (3.05)
InstOwn -0.196** -0.186** -0.197**
(-2.52) (-2.39) (-2.50)
Analysts -0.000 -0.002 0.001
(-0.01) (-0.07) (0.04)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 455,607 455,607 455,607
Adj. R2 0.486 0.487 0.485
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